The women-only dating-advice app Tea "has been hit with 10 potential class action lawsuits in federal and state court," NBC News reported last week, "after a data breach led to the leak of thousands of selfies, ID photos and private conversations online."
The suits could result in Tea having to pay tens of millions of dollars in damages to the plaintiffs, which could be catastrophic for the company, an expert told NBC News... One of the suits lists the right-wing online discussion board 4chan and the social platform X as defendants, alleging that they allowed bad actors to spread users' personal information.
But meanwhile, a new competing app for men called "TeaOnHer" has already been launched. And it was also found to have enormous security flaws, reports TechCrunch, that "exposed its users' personal information, including photos of their driver's licenses and other government-issued identity documents..."
[W]hen we looked at the TeaOnHer's public internet records, it had no meaningful information other than a single subdomain, appserver.teaonher.com. When we opened this page in our browser, what loaded was the landing page for TeaOnHer's API (for the curious, we uploaded a copy here)... It was on this landing page that we found the exposed email address and plaintext password (which wasn't that far off from "password") for [TeaOnHer developer Xavier] Lampkin's account to access the TeaOnHer "admin panel"... This API landing page included an endpoint called /docs, which contained the API's auto-generated documentation (powered by a product called Swagger UI) that contained the full list of commands that can be performed on the API [including administrator commands to return user data]...
While it's not uncommon for developers to publish their API documentation, the problem here was that some API requests could be made without any authentication — no passwords or credentials were needed...
The records returned from TeaOnHer's server contained users' unique identifiers within the app (essentially a string of random letters and numbers), their public profile screen name, and self-reported age and location, along with their private email address. The records also included web address links containing photos of the users' driver's licenses and corresponding selfies. Worse, these photos of driver's licenses, government-issued IDs, and selfies were stored in an Amazon-hosted S3 cloud server set as publicly accessible to anyone with their web addresses. This public setting lets anyone with a link to someone's identity documents open the files from anywhere with no restrictions... ...
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